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ABSTRACT 
 
 
COMPARISON STUDYOF DISAGGREGATED ODA AND FDI IMPACT ON 
WELFARE OF ODA RECIPIENT COUNTRIES 
 
 
By 
 
 
Young-ji Lee 
 
 
This study compares effect of ODA, Disaggregated ODA and FDI on developing 
countries’ welfare. The aim of this paper is to seek the most efficient way of promoting 
inclusive growth and help development entities to forge development strategy. Econometrics 
estimation, using panel data of 108 ODA recipient countries from period of 2005 to 2013, 
suggests that FDI has higher impact than ODA on HDI when observed with overall samples, 
but mixed results were drawn based on different regions and income levels. The major 
findings of this empirical study are; first, ODA as a whole does not have significant impact 
on HDI, but marginal impact of disaggregated ODA on welfare is positive, second, when 
tested by disaggregated ODA, economic infrastructure ODA has higher impact than FDI, 
third, policy interaction terms of disaggregated ODA have a positive impact on HDI in Lower 
Middle Income Countries. This implies that aid practitioners should be cautious when setting 
a strategy, and take an individual approach based on partner countries’ context.  
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Ⅰ. Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Overview 
The origin of official development aid (ODA) can be traced back to Marshall Plan, an 
American initiative to aid Europe. Launched from period of 1948 to 1951, the purpose of this 
initiative was to support rebuilding European economies from aftermath of World War II. 
This 60-year history of development aid has attributed to decline of the extreme poverty. As a 
result, the number of people living in extreme poverty has declined by more than half, falling 
from 1.9 billion in 1990 to 836 million in 2015(United Nations, 2015). On the other hand, 
regardless of 60-year long history of ODA, more than 1/5 of the population is still captured in 
the chains of extreme poverty (KOICA, 2011). As the target year of Millennium 
Development Goals is now ending, international community is committed to forming Post-
MDGs, which is known as Sustainable Development Goals. The key feature of post MDGs is 
comprehensive development; no one is to be left behind. In other words, the focus of new 
goals is on inclusive growth and people’s welfare (KOICA, 2015). Among various measures 
taken to solve poverty issue, foreign aid is the far most controversial discourse of all. Moyo 
(2009) asserts that execution of ODA should be terminated because aid deteriorates situations 
in African countries by aggravating corruption.  According to Moyo, economic measures 
such as foreign investment and trade should be pursued to achieve sustainable growth.  
The result of empirical test on aid effectiveness varies depending on variables being 
included and used. While most of these mixed results focus on the impact of aid flows on 
GDP growth, not much research has been conducted on the impact of foreign aid towards 
human development indicators (Masud and Yontcheva, 2005). Numerous empirical studies 
have confirmed that economic growth is the most effective tool for reducing poverty and 
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improving the quality of life of people in aid recipient countries (DFID, 2008). However, 
even if economic growth has been found to be necessary in enhancing well-being, poverty 
incidence tends to be quite unresponsive to economic growth among the highest-inequality 
countries (Ravallion, 2007). Therefore, in order to confirm aid effectiveness on reducing 
poverty, it is more valid to test the impact of aid on welfare than economic growth. In regards 
to this, Boone (1996) examines impact of aid on human development indicators such as 
infant mortality rate, life expectancy and primary schooling. He interprets higher level of 
these index (except for infant mortality rate, which is lower the better), as evidence of greater 
empowerment of the poor (Boone, 1996). Likewise, in this paper, Human Development Index 
(HDI)is adopted as an adequate indicator for people’s welfare. Such choice can also be 
attributed to insufficient amount of data being compiled for other poverty index.  
The aim of this paper is to empirically compare impact of foreign aid and foreign 
investment on human development index. It measures effect of net ODA at large, as well as 
disaggregated sectors of ODA on different purposes. Moreover, the study adds policy 
interaction tern for ODA and FDI to ensure enhanced effects of good institution. Empirical 
test builds on three panel data sets which are 108 aid recipient countries as a whole, by 
regional and by income level of countries. 
 
1.2 Hypothesis 
1) ODA has higher impact that FDI on welfare of ODA recipient countries. 
2) Policy interaction terms of ODA and FDI have more positive impact on welfare than that 
of a single variable. 
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II. Literature Review 
 
 
Theoretical underpinning of aid effectiveness lies on two-gap model (Chenery and 
Strout, 1966). Originated from Harrod Domar model1, two-gap model deems that developing 
countries face constraints on savings and export earnings, which hamper investment and 
economic growth (Masud and Yontcheva, 2005). According to the model, the role of aid is to 
fill the gap of investment-savings gap as well as foreign exchange gap, contributing to 
economic growth (Chenery and Strout, 1966). It has provided the fundamental principles both 
for early aid policies and for regression models of most empirical papers which focused on 
aid-growth and aid-savings relations (Masud and Yontcheva, 2005).  
 
 
2.1 Aid effectiveness and institutional quality 
Aforementioned, correlations between aid and growth have mixed results depending 
on what the model focuses on. Boon (1996) measures impact of aid on investment, 
consumption and basic human development indicators. He concludes that aid increased 
consumption more than investment and growth and that political regime is a detrimental 
factor for aid to be effective (Boon, 1996). The most controversial studies are the ones made 
by World Bank (1998) and Burnside and Dollar (2000) (Lee, 2013). These papers investigate 
impact of aid conditional on the policy. The findings confirm aid has had little impact on per-
capita GDP growth on average, but it has been effective when interaction term of aid and 
policy is added. Policy equation of Burnside and Dollar is as follow: 
Policy = 1.28 + 6.85 Budget surplus – 1.4 Inflation + 2.16 Openness 
 
This implies that aid works in countries with sound policy and good institutional environment. 
                                          
1 A functional economic relationship in which the growth rate of gross domestic product depends directly on the 
national net savings rate and inversely on the national capital-output ratio (Todaro and Smith, 2012) 
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However, above equation of policy value was questioned for its simplicity by Hansen and 
Tarp (2000). In their paper, include investment and human capital, as well as aid, aid squared, 
aid-policy interaction term and policy squared into a regression model. The result confirms 
that aid has positive correlation with the growth rate, and it is not conditional on the policy 
index proposed by Burnside and Dollar. Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) also reinvestigated the 
aid effectiveness results of Burnside and Dollar (2000), using the same data set as the original 
study. They found that effect of aid on growth was positive on any policy environment 
depending on deletion of few countries’ observation. In other words, impact of aid 
conditional on policy is not a robust result. Collier and Dollar (2002) reassesses this matter by 
adding more specific concept of policy proxies into a regression, which are institutional 
quality (ICRG) and Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). Even when more 
complex variables are added to the model, the result shows that aid reduces poverty when it is 
allocated to countries with good institution and policy. Finding of Lee (2013) is also 
consistent with studies of World Bank (1998), Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Collier and 
Dollar (2002). Aid itself has negative effects on per capita GDP growth, but when it is 
interacted with institution variable, it has positive impact on growth. The most recent study in 
regard to macroeconomic policy and aid effectiveness is conducted by Ma (2015). The result 
of panel analysis reveals positive and significant effect of grant aid on economic growth of 42 
main development partners of Korea. Meanwhile, interaction term of aid and macroeconomic 
policy, expressed in terms of inflation rate, is not significant. This implies effect of grant aid 
on economic growth is not conditional on macroeconomic policy.  
 
 
2.2 FDI and Growth 
Theoretically, FDI can be an engine for economic growth. The standard Solow-type 
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neoclassical model suggests that FDI increases economic growth by adding to the capital 
stock (Driffield and Jones, 2013).  Other than increase in overall net transfer of revenue, 
FDI can also be effectual on improving welfare by creating jobs for workers. For this to be 
valid, the number of jobs created must be greater than the number of jobs lost as a result of 
FDI related activities such as layoffs due to mergers and acquisitions, the closing of local 
firms (Gohou and Soumare, 2011). Jang (2007) also predicts that FDI does not always lead to 
economic growth, apropos to domination of big multilateral companies on domestic market 
when proper restriction policy had not taken place. Despite such downside of FDI, one of the 
strongest opponents of foreign aid, Moyo (2011) argues that FDI is a vital measure for 
achieving sustainable growth in developing countries. She deems foreign aid as a main cause 
of corruption in African countries, and supports macroeconomic instruments such as FDI and 
trade as a way to achieve growth (Moyo, 2011). 
Empirical results of ODA and FDI impacts on growth vary. Ma (2015) includes both 
ODA and FDI into a regression. It concludes that both ODA and FDI have positive impact on 
growth at large, but different results are being drawn based on regional and income level. 
When analyzed by region, ODA is positively correlated, but impact of FDI is only significant 
in Latin American countries. Empirical results by income level reveal that ODA is positive 
among least developing countries, and FDI is positively correlated only in upper middle 
income countries. On the other hand Lee (2013) has found that both aid and FDI variables 
have negative impacts on growth. However, when aid is interacted with policy it is positively 
correlated with economic growth. 
As discussed above, there are several studies relating aid effectiveness with policy. 
Likewise, previous research on the importance of institutions suggests a positive and 
significant relationship between institutional reform and economic performance (Babecky 
and Campos, 2011). Boerner and Hainz (2009) concludes that reforms reduce investment risk, 
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generating higher returns to private sector investment and innovation as well as eliminating 
sources of corruption. On the basis of this, developing countries are recommended by 
multilateral entities to ameliorate their institutions and national governance structures 
(Driffield and Jones, 2013). The result of Driffield and Jones (2013) indicates that better 
ICRG variable not only attracts larger scale FDI, but also generates higher economic growth. 
In other words, countries with robust protection on investors and higher level of law and 
order will experience enhanced growth. 
Acknowledging significant role of policy on growth model, this paper includes 
policy interaction terms of ODA and FDI, in addition to overall ODA and FDI share. 
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Ⅲ. Research Method and Data 
 
 
3.1 Methodology 
The purpose of this study is to compare the impact FDI and ODA on Human 
Development Index, and how each variable is associated with policy. It is based on the 
sample of 108 countries and time period from 2005 to 2013. The analysis employs following 
two panel regressions: 
 
Welfare it = a + b1 ODA it + b2 ODA it ² + b3 ODA* ICRG it + b4 FDI it +  
b5 FDI* ICRG it + b6 Trade it + b7 ICRG it + b8 Social Expenditure it + b9 GFC it + 
b10 Inflation it + b11 Population Growth it + b12 GDPpc it + e it  
(1)            
 
Welfare it = a + b1 Social Infra ODA it + b2 Social Infra ODA it ²+ b3 Social Infra ODA * 
ICRG it + b4 Econ Infra ODA/GDP it + b5 Econ Infra ODA it ²+ b6 Econ Infra 
ODA/GDP * ICRG it + b7 Production ODA it + b8 Production ODA it ²+  
b9 Production ODA * ICRG it + b10 Multi ODA it + b11 Multi ODA it ²+ b12 Multi 
ODA *ICRG it + b13 FDI it + b14 FDI* ICRG it+ b15 Trade it + b16 ICRG it +  
b17 Social Expenditure it + b18 GFC it + b19 Inflation it + b20 Population Growth it + 
b21 GDP pc it + e it  
 (2) 
Where detailed description is shown in <Appendix Table 1>. 
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Equation (1) tests overall correlation of welfare and ODA and equation (2) estimates 
effect of ODA by sectors for different purposes. In this paper, fixed effects model is chosen 
over random effects model, as it is favored by the result of Hausman specification test. 
Cameron and Trivedi (2005) observe that fixed effects may be used to control for 
endogeneity in panel data where endogeniety arises owing to a time-invariant omitted 
variable.  
 
 
3.2 Variables 
The main variables used in this paper to compare the impact of ODA and FDI on 
welfare are net ODA, disaggregated ODA, net inflow of FDI, HDI and number of control 
variables.  
 
Welfare  
The dependent variable representing welfare is the UNDP’s Human Development 
Index (HDI). It is a composite statistic developed by the UNDP to capture the income, life 
expectancy, and educational attainment of individual nations. Despite the fact that aid 
bureaucracies define their final objective as “poverty reduction” (Easterly, 2003), 
conventional studies apply GDP per capital growth as to capture economic dimension of 
welfare. However, development is multidimensional phenomenon, and welfare depends not 
only on economic factors but on social factors such as health care, education, and income. 
Poverty ratio can also be a proper indicator to measure standard of living. However, data for 
poverty incidence is not recorded and compiled annually and it is too country-specific to be 
aggregated across countries. Such non-availability of data does not allow it to be used in 
empirical studies. Meanwhile, HDI is relatively well compiled across countries, and thus it 
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was selected as a dependent variable. 
 
Net ODA and Disaggregated ODA 
This paper employs net official development assistance (ODA) deflated by GDP. Net 
ODA is consisted of disbursements of loans made on concessional and grants by donor 
agencies to promote economic development and welfare in ODA recipients. It includes loans 
with a grant element of at least 25 percent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 percent) 
(World Bank Indicator, 2015).  
OECD/DAC categorizes types of ODA based on Creditor Reporting Systems(CRS).2 There 
are four main forms of ODA which are Social Infrastructure and Services, Economic 
Infrastructure and Services, Production Sectors and Multisector (OECD statistics, 2015). 
Detailed description of each type is as follow: 
1) Social Infrastructure and Services: This main category supports efforts to develop the 
human resource potential and improve living conditions in developing countries. It 
includes education, health and population, water supply, sanitation and sewerage.  
2) Economic Infrastructure and Services: This major heading includes assistance for 
networks, utilities and services that facilitate economic activity. It includes energy, 
transportation and communications. 
3) Production Sectors: This main heading groups contributions to all directly productive 
sectors. It comprises agriculture, fishing , forestry, industry, mining and construction, 
trade and tourism. 
4) Multisector: This type of aid covers several sectors, with a concentration on the 
environment, gender projects and urban and rural development. 
                                          
2 The objective of the CRS Aid Activity database is to provide a set of readily available basic data that enables 
analysis on where aid goes, what purposes it serves and what policies it aims to implement, on a comparable 
basis for all DAC members. Data are collected on individual projects and programmes. (ODA statistics). 
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Foreign Direct Investment 
FDI is measured by FDI net inflows, the sum of equity capital, reinvested earnings, long-
term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payment (World Bank 
Indicator, 2015).  
 
Policy  
Policy variable is measured by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) rating. It 
comprises 22 variables in three subcategories of risk: political, financial and economic. There 
are total 12 components in the category of political risk.3 This study adds only three scores 
among many subcategories of composite index. Following three scores capture institutional 
quality; Corruption (0~6 scores), law and order(0~6 scores), and bureaucracy quality(0~4 
scores). Selection of these three scores is consistent with study of Lee (2013). 
 
Social Expenditure 
Government spending is expected to ameliorate welfare because HDI measures the 
outcome of aid recipient’ investments in education and health as well as countries’ economic 
performances, all of which are mainly supported by government spending. Especially in 
developing countries, citizens’ basic needs are principally ensured by government spending 
(Gohou and Soumare, 2011). 
 
Gross Capital Formation 
Gross capital formation consists of outlays and fixed assets of the economy plus net 
                                          
3 1)Government Stability, 2)Socioeconomic Conditions, 3)Investment Profile, 4)Internal Conflict, 5)External 
Conflict, 6)Corruption, 7)Military in Politics, 8)Religious Tensions, 9)Law and Order, 10)Ethnic Tensions, 
11)Democratic Accountability, 12)Bureaucracy Quality. (The PRS Group) 
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changes in the level of inventories. Fixed assets include land improvements, plant, machinery, 
and equipment purchases; and the infrastructure such as roads, schools, offices, hospitals and 
private residential dwellings. By laying ground work for improvement in health and 
education, these assets may affect people’s welfare (World Bank Indicator, 2015). 
 
Inflation 
Inflation is introduced to capture macroeconomic instability. Inflation is expected to have 
a direct negative impact on welfare as high inflation increases the price of basic goods and 
directly impacts the poor (Lucas, 2000).4  
 
Population Growth 
Population increase could be associated with welfare. Larger population might cause 
fewer public resources to be distributed to people, but at the same time, larger human capital 
can support economy.  
 
GDP per capita 
Basically, most studies have assumed that economic growth and welfare are perfectly 
and positively correlated and have thus used GDP growth as a proxy for welfare. Since 
overall economic growth might have spillover effects such as job creation, better public 
infrastructure and facility, which lead to inclusive growth. However, this assumption has 
recently been challenged, and evidence from several sources now indicates that GDP can 
grow even as poverty is on the rise (Ravallion, 2007). 
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Ⅳ. Analysis and Findings 
 
 
4.1 Overall Trend 
The estimated results of total 108 ODA recipients from year 2005-2013, are indicated in 
<Table 1>. The estimation of equation (1) tests impact of total ODA and equation (2) shows 
impact of disaggregated ODA on welfare. 
 As shown in <Table 1>, the estimation result of equation (1) shows that overall ODA 
amount is insignificant to welfare. Moreover, though ODA squared term is correlated with 
HDI, no evidence is found for decreasing marginal returns to ODA as it is not negative. The 
interaction term ODA*policy is also insignificant, which means policy does not exercise any 
influence against aid effectiveness. On the other hand, FDI has significant impact on HDI, 
Meanwhile, the interaction term of ICRG was negatively correlated with HDI, but this is 
insignificant since ICRG variable alone is insignificant. In other words, policy interaction 
term is only valid when individual ICRG variable is significant. Overall, the tests confirm 
that ODA has been ineffectual, while FDI has been effective in promoting welfare of 
recipient countries during the period of 2005-2013. In < Appendix Table 4> government’s 
social expenditure is positively related, implying that government spending is well used to 
serve its purpose. Other control variables such as gross fixed capital, population growth and 
GDP per capita are also positively correlated with HDI as expected. 
Result of equation (1) in <Table 1>, does not necessarily imply that ODA has no 
contribution in improving welfare. In order to ensure impact of ODA based on a different 
purpose, equation (2) tests for HDI based on ODA by different sectors. Among four main 
sectors of ODA, only economic infrastructure and service sector is found to be positively 
associated with HDI. Squared term of this variable is negative, indicating diminishing returns, 
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which is congruent with the earlier studies (Burnside and Dollar,2000; Hansen and Tarp, 
2000; Dalgaard and Hasen, 2001; Collier and Dollar, 2002; Lee, 2013). Other sectors of ODA; 
Social ODA, Production ODA, Multi ODA are statistically insignificant. Meanwhile, FDI is 
once again empirically proven to be effective in improving welfare when tested with equation 
(2), yet economic ODA has greater impact. Social expenditure, GFC, Population Growth, 
GDPpc have positive impact on welfare, while inflation is negative as expected < Appendix 
Table 4>. In order to see overall net effect of aid on HDI, marginal impact of aid should be 
assessed by looking at the differential coefficient of equation (2). This can be derived as 
follows: 
 
MHDI= 0.0132+2* (-0.0000811)(Econ ODA) + -0.00487*(ICRG)+ 2*1.243(Multi ODA) 
 
When taking the mean value of the variables in equation (2) from <Appendix Table 2>, 
the marginal impact of disaggregated ODA on HDI is positive. Thus, disaggregated ODA has 
positive effects on improvement of welfare. 
In order to analyze impact of ODA and FDI conditional on certain exogenous factors, 
this study expects that the impact of aid on governance may differ depending on invariant 
conditions of each country. These conditions include geographical location, and income level. 
Results by total, regional and income level are shown in <Appendix Table4>, < Appendix 
Table5> and < Appendix Table6> respectively. 
 
4.2 Impact by Geographical Location 
98 ODA recipient countries are divided into 4 categories based on their geographical 
locations; Asia (East Asia & South Asia& Central Asia), Africa, Latin America and Europe. 
In Asian countries, neither overall ODA nor FDI was statistically significant<Appendix Table 
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5, Equation (1.1)>. In regards to impact of disaggregated ODA, which is the second equation, 
none of the ODA variables have proven to be statistical significance in Asia < Appendix 
Table 5, Equation (1.2)>. FDI has negative correlation with HDI. Apropos of Africa, only 
Economic ODA and FDI are positive among other variables, but FDI has slightly greater 
effect. 
Among four different regions, overall ODA amount was statistically significant only in 
Latin American countries, although negatively associated. Also, contrary to expectation, 
ICRG variable is negative for both equation (1) and (2). Yet, interaction variable of ODA and 
ICRG has positive sign. In accordance, Multi sector ODA in equation (2) has negative impact, 
but Economic ODA is positively correlated with HDI. This means, welfare in Latin America 
can be enhanced when Economic ODA takes place. 
 
4.3 Impact by Income Level 
104 developing countries are divided into 3 different groups based on income level; 
Upper Middle Income Countries (UMICs), Lower Middle Income Countries (LMICs) and 
Least Developing Countries (LDCs). 
 In case of UMICs, both overall ODA and FDI are insignificant in < Table 1, Equation 
(1)>. In regards to second equation with disaggregated ODA, Production ODA shows 
statistical significance, but with a negative sign. Contrary to earlier study by Ma (2015), FDI 
is insignificant in both equation (1) and (2). 
In accordance with UMICS group, both overall ODA and FDI are insignificant for 
LMICS group as indicated in <Table1, Equation (1)> and < Appendix Table 6, Equation 
(2.1)>. Yet, when tested based on ODA by sector (equation (2)), Social ODA and Economic 
ODA have positive association with HDI. Although Production ODA and Multi sector ODA 
have negative effects on HDI, their policy interaction terms have positive impact on welfare. 
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This implies Production ODA and Multi sector ODA in countries within LMICs groups are 
effectual in countries with sound institution. Moreover, ICRG variable in this group is 
positive for both equations. 
   In LDCs group, ODA has negative impact on HDI < Appendix Table 6, Equation 
(3.1)>. On the other hand, overall FDI net inflow is statistically insignificant, but its policy 
interaction term is effectual for promoting welfare. In regards to impact of disaggregated 
ODA, none of the sectors have shown to be effective < Appendix Table 6, Equation (3.2)>. 
 
  <Table 1> Summary of Regression Results (2005-2013) 
Dependent Variable: Full Sample Regional: Asia 
HDI Equation(1) Equation(2) Equation(1) Equation(2) 
ODA 0.000581  0.0105  
  (0.77)  (0.51)  
ODA *ICRG -0.000805  -0.00810  
  (-1.48)  (-1.11)  
FDI 0.00176*** 0.00169*** -0.00482 -0.00633* 
  (2.95) (3.13) (-1.32) (-1.93) 
FDI*ICRG -0.000858*** -0.000832*** 0.00168 0.00238* 
  (-3.01) (-3.23) (1.18) (1.91) 
ICRG 0.0123 0.00591 0.0443 0.0304 
  (1.69) (0.81) (1.40) (0.87) 
Social ODA   -0.00256  0.0471 
   (-1.18)  (0.91) 
Social ODA *ICRG  0.000225  -0.0275 
   (0.19)  (-1.31) 
Economic ODA   0.0132***  0.00683 
   (4.32)  (0.15) 
Economic ODA *ICRG  -0.00487***  -0.00192 
   (-3.19)  (-0.10) 
Production ODA   -0.0117  -0.0303 
   (-1.16)  (-0.71) 
Production ODA *ICRG  0.00511  0.00863 
   (1.08)  (0.87) 
Multi ODA   -0.0100  -0.348 
   (-1.16)  (-1.23) 
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Multi ODA *ICRG  0.00371  0.118 
   (0.80)  (0.97) 
    
Note: 1) Number in parentheses are t-statistics. 
2) *, **, ***, represent the level of significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Table1 continued 
Dependent Variable: Regional: Africa Regional: Latin America 
HDI Equation(1) Equation(2) Equation(1) Equation(2) 
ODA -0.000139  -0.0112***  
  (-0.09)  (-4.93)  
ODA *ICRG -0.000539  0.00366***  
  (-0.57)  (3.87)  
FDI 0.00145 0.00157* -0.000754 -0.00132 
  (1.49) (1.74) (-0.52) (-0.90) 
FDI*ICRG -0.000617 -0.000659 0.000169 0.000403 
  (-1.09) (-1.29) (0.32) (0.73) 
ICRG 0.000911 -0.00961 -0.0136* -0.0132* 
  (0.08) (-1.02) (-2.03) (-1.75) 
Social ODA   -0.00184  0.00184 
   (-0.59)  (0.18) 
Social ODA *ICRG  0.0000238  -0.00361 
   (0.01)  (-0.66) 
Economic ODA   0.0147***  0.0201** 
   (3.07)  (2.57) 
Economic ODA *ICRG  -0.00619**  -0.00944** 
   (-2.13)  (-2.44) 
Production ODA   -0.0221  -0.0429 
   (-1.63)  (-1.69) 
Production ODA *ICRG  0.00970  0.0200 
   (1.45)  (1.61) 
Multi ODA   -0.00375  -0.112*** 
   (-0.33)  (-4.14) 
Multi ODA *ICRG  0.000538  0.0439*** 
 (0.07)  (3.41) 
    
Note: 1) Number in parentheses are t-statistics. 
2) *, **, ***, represent the level of significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
Table1 continued 
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Dependent Variable: By Income: UMICs By Income: LMICs 
HDI Equation(1) Equation(2) Equation(1) Equation(2) 
ODA -0.00140  -0.000767  
  (-0.48)  (-0.83)  
ODA *ICRG 0.000510  -0.0000591  
  (0.28)  (-0.16)  
FDI -0.000909 0.000464 0.00230 0.00384 
  (-0.44) (0.21) (0.66) (1.48) 
FDI*ICRG -0.000543 -0.00112 -0.00107 -0.00168 
  (-0.49) (-0.94) (-0.74) (-1.53) 
ICRG 0.0120 0.00320 0.0445* 0.0536** 
  (0.56) (0.16) (1.93) (2.51) 
Social ODA   -0.00820  0.0140* 
   (-1.33)  (1.55) 
Social ODA *ICRG  -0.00317  -0.00798** 
   (-1.14)  (-2.18) 
Economic ODA   -0.0166  0.0180*** 
   (-0.96)  (3.37) 
Economic ODA *ICRG  0.00870  -0.00723*** 
   (0.96)  (-2.78) 
Production ODA   -0.122***  -0.0458*** 
   (-5.05)  (-2.91) 
Production ODA *ICRG  0.0546***  0.0203** 
   (3.15)  (2.55) 
Multi ODA   -0.0149  -0.0556*** 
   (-1.08)  (-3.37) 
Multi ODA *ICRG  0.00680  0.0233*** 
 (0.63)  (2.71) 
    
Note: 1) Number in parentheses are t-statistics. 
2) *, **, ***, represent the level of significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table1 continued 
Dependent Variable: By Income: LDCs 
HDI Equation(1) Equation(2) 
ODA -0.00292***  
  (-3.19)  
ODA *ICRG 0.000382  
  (1.02)  
FDI -0.000273 0.0000778 
  (-1.30) (0.34) 
FDI*ICRG 0.000160** 0.0000403 
  (1.98) (0.47) 
ICRG -0.00304 -0.000818 
  (-0.34) (-0.09) 
Social ODA   -0.00287 
   (-1.20) 
Social ODA *ICRG  0.000670 
   (0.49) 
Economic ODA   -0.000970 
   (-0.31) 
Economic ODA *ICRG  0.000703 
   (0.44) 
Production ODA   -0.00227 
   (-0.33) 
Production ODA *ICRG  0.000848 
   (0.26) 
Multi ODA   0.0138 
   (0.93) 
Multi ODA *ICRG  -0.00958* 
   (-2.03) 
  
Note: 1) Number in parentheses are t-statistics. 
2) *, **, ***, represent the level of significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Ⅴ. Conclusion 
 
 
Aid Effectiveness has been a topic of debate in development discourse for a long time. 
Development entities have a burden to prove that value for aid money is being realized, thus 
it has been effective for reducing poverty. Conventional studies have focused on impact of 
ODA and FDI on economic growth expressed as GDP growth. With the advent of Post-
MDGs, new interest has been emerged for sustainable development and inclusive growth. In 
this study, aid effectiveness as a contributor to welfare was analyzed using the data collected 
from 108 countries over the period 2005-1013. This paper has empirically proven and 
compared impact of ODA, FDI and disaggregated ODA. 
The major findings of this empirical study are; first, ODA as a whole does not have 
significant impact on HDI, but marginal impact of disaggregated ODA on welfare is positive, 
second, when tested by disaggregated ODA, economic infrastructure ODA had higher impact 
than FDI, third, policy interaction term was insignificant in many cases as single ICRG was 
statistically insignificant. 
However, variables had shown mixed results when samples were divided by regional 
and income level. When observed by region, neither economic ODA nor FDI had a positive 
impact in Asia. In Africa samples, both economic ODA and FDI were positive and 
insignificant, but FDI was slightly greater than economic ODA. Impact of ODA was 
generally insignificant, except for Latin America where ODA was negatively associated with 
welfare. In this region, economic ODA had higher impact than FDI. 
Apropos of samples by income level, ODA was statistically insignificant except among 
LDCs group which had negative correlation with HDI. Impact of ODA by sector was 
significant only for LMICs group of which Social ODA variable had positive impact on 
20 
 
welfare. Meanwhile, FDI alone was insignificant among all three groups. Policy interaction 
term of Economic ODA and Multi Sector ODA were also effective in improving welfare of 
LMICs. In conclusion, this paper fails to reject null hypothesis for hypothesis (1) as higher 
impact of ODA than FDI was not proven. It also rejects null hypothesis for hypothesis (2), as 
ICRG variable was insignificant in most cases, and as a number of interaction terms were 
negatively correlated with HDI. Implication of overall findings suggests that there is no ‘one 
size fits all’ method for international development. Therefore, relevant development agencies 
and ODA donors should consider individual strategies based on different regional and income 
level when executing development aid. 
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Appendix 
<Appendix Table 1> Description of Data 
Variable Explanation Source 
HDI 
Human Development Index is a composite statistic of 
life expectancy, education, and per capita income 
indicators. 
UNDP 
ODA Net official development assistance and official aid received (% of GDP) World Bank Data 
FDI Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) World Bank Data 
Trade Sum of exports and imports of goods and services (% of GDP) World Bank Data 
ICRG Average of Indicator; bureaucracy quality (Range 0~4), corruption (0~6), and law and order (0~6) The PRS Group 
Social Expenditure Sum of health expenditure and education expenditure (% of GDP) World Bank Data 
Inflation Inflation GDP deflator (annual %) World Bank Data 
GFC Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) World Bank Data 
Population Growth Population growth (annual %) World Bank Data 
GDPPC Gross domestic product per Capita World Bank Data 
Social ODA Social Infrastructure and Services Aid (% of GDP) OECD Statistics 
Economic ODA  Economic Infrastructure and Services Aid  (% of GDP) OECD Statistics 
Production ODA  Production Sectors Aid (% of GDP) OECD Statistics 
Multi ODA Multisector Aid (% of GDP) OECD Statistics 
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< Appendix Table 2> Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
HDI 954 0.588 0.134 0.292 0.822 
ODA 972 9.464 20.449 -0.5544482 228.400 
(ODA)² 972 507.319 3636.082 4.72e-09 52166.660 
ODA *ICRG 674 14.546 35.075 -1.293712 342.600 
FDI 971 5.184 6.438 -5.980456 85.368 
FDI*ICRG 673 11.541 13.789 -11.30306 142.280 
Trade 961 84.310 34.362 22.1383 219.255 
ICRG 674 2.233 0.562 0.6666667 4.167 
Social Expenditure 961 12.613 21.246 2.20131 290.662 
Inflation 970 8.306 9.145 -25.3128 103.823 
GFC 896 23.252 8.715 1.356692 79.349 
Population Growth 971 1.711 1.004 -0.789469 4.938 
GDPpc 972 3039.515 3020.977 29.61651 16883.950 
Social ODA 972 2.950 6.421 0.0065782 72.573 
(Social ODA)² 972 49.888 279.924 0.0000433 5266.845 
Social ODA  
*ICRG 674 3.964 9.166 0.0153491 108.860 
Economic ODA 965 0.807 2.499 0.0000425 50.364 
(Economic ODA)² 965 6.888 88.604 1.81e-09 2536.527 
Economic ODA 
*ICRG 672 1.092 4.175 0.0001063 92.334 
Production ODA 972 0.395 0.813 0.0001946 9.722 
(Production ODA)² 972 0.816 4.903 3.79e-08 94.520 
Production ODA 
*ICRG 672 0.586 1.080 0.0007191 7.703 
Multi ODA 972 0.458 1.520 0.0000634 37.228 
(Multi ODA)² 972 0.000 0.005 4.02e-13 0.139 
Multi ODA *ICRG 674 0.613 2.507 0.0001373 55.841 
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< Appendix Table 3> Variable Correlations  
 
Panel A. Variable Correlations for Equation (1) 
 
 
 
 
Variable HDI ODA ODA² ODA *ICRG FDI 
FDI* 
ICRG Trade ICRG Soc Ex Inflation GFC POPGR
GDP
pc 
HDI 1        
ODA -0.314 1  
ODA² -0.1483 0.9371 1  
ODA 
*ICRG -0.3457 0.9893 0.9087 1          
FDI -0.0682 0.142 0.0552 0.1602 1  
FDI* 
ICRG 0.0477 0.0661 0.012 0.0926 0.9521 1        
Trade 0.0846 -0.0827 -0.08 -0.0959 0.2554 0.2825 1  
ICRG 0.4139 -0.2612 -0.1668 -0.2084 -0.0073 0.2091 0.0519 1  
Soc Ex 0.0892 0.4175 0.3059 0.4185 -0.0144 -0.0343 -0.1136 -0.1291 1  
Inflation -0.0459 0.0642 0.0266 0.0571 0.0038 0.0023 0.0435 -0.0795 0.0012 1  
GFC 0.2097 -0.0164 0.0091 0.0149 0.2818 0.3541 0.1955 0.3767 0.0072 0.0229 1  
POP GR -0.6742 0.2518 0.1187 0.2846 0.0904 0.0149 -0.1415 -0.2916 -0.0401 0.0222 -0.1638 1  
GDPpc 0.6582 -0.2904 -0.1341 -0.3293 -0.0447 0.0546 0.0708 0.3974 -0.1386 -0.0587 0.0934 -0.4129 1 
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Panel B. Variable Correlations for Equation (2) 
Variable HDI Social ODA 
(Social 
ODA)² 
Social 
ODA 
*ICRG 
Econ 
ODA 
(Econ 
ODA)² 
Econ ODA 
*ICRG 
Production 
ODA 
(Production 
ODA)² 
Production 
ODA 
*ICRG 
HDI 1 
Social ODA  -0.2446 1 
(Social ODA)² -0.0931 0.91 1 
Social ODA  
*ICRG -0.259 0.9877 0.8725 1       
Economic ODA  -0.0461 0.4126 0.3306 0.4244 1 
(Economic ODA)² 0.0342 0.1341 0.0884 0.1408 0.8967 1 
Economic ODA  
*ICRG -0.0381 0.364 0.2761 0.3861 0.9909 0.8878 1    
Production ODA  -0.2614 0.685 0.4965 0.7149 0.455 0.1808 0.4284 1 
(Production ODA)² -0.0928 0.6985 0.6116 0.7037 0.4185 0.1482 0.3805 0.9048 1 
Production ODA  
*ICRG -0.2667 0.6176 0.4204 0.6704 0.4331 0.173 0.4235 0.9756 0.8347 1 
Multi ODA  -0.1095 0.6535 0.6114 0.6267 0.1976 0.0882 0.177 0.2797 0.2646 0.2536 
(Multi ODA)² -0.055 0.4079 0.4089 0.378 0.0301 0.0102 0.0229 0.0399 0.0329 0.0291 
Multi ODA * 
ICRG -0.1119 0.6597 0.6044 0.642 0.2178 0.1005 0.2013 0.3112 0.286 0.293 
FDI -0.0674 0.1104 0.0149 0.1214 0.1246 0.0103 0.124 0.1592 0.0962 0.155 
FDI 
*ICRG 0.0488 0.0471 -0.0164 0.07 0.0914 0.0003 0.1039 0.0938 0.0454 0.1101 
Trade 0.084 -0.0988 -0.0986 -0.1053 -0.0082 -0.0261 0.0031 -0.0959 -0.0899 -0.0912 
ICRG 0.4147 -0.2306 -0.1439 -0.1704 -0.0926 -0.0415 -0.0416 -0.2114 -0.1666 -0.1207 
Social Expenditure 0.0901 0.5585 0.4096 0.5685 0.4385 0.3466 0.4159 0.5961 0.5996 0.5456 
Inflation -0.0502 0.0411 0.0107 0.0373 0.0349 0.0048 0.0384 0.081 0.0653 0.0722 
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GFC 0.2123 -0.0282 -0.0067 0.0013 0.0452 0.0081 0.0755 0.0195 0.0002 0.0605 
Population Growth -0.6748 0.2052 0.0778 0.2277 0.0558 -0.0052 0.0442 0.2243 0.0926 0.2298 
GDPpc 0.6572 -0.2859 -0.1269 -0.3153 -0.1665 -0.0544 -0.1707 -0.3642 -0.1986 -0.3809 
 
 
 
Panel B Continued 
Variable Multi ODA 
(Multi 
ODA)² 
Multi 
ODA 
*ICRG 
FDI FDI* ICRG Trade ICRG Soc Ex Inflation GFC POPGR GDPpc 
Multi ODA 1 
(Multi ODA)² 0.9279 1 
Multi ODA  
*ICRG 0.9959 0.9092 1          
FDI 0.0355 0.0024 0.0439 1 
FDI 
*ICRG 0.0059 -0.0121 0.0207 0.9521 1        
Trade -0.0697 -0.0489 -0.0675 0.2557 0.2828 1 
ICRG -0.1297 -0.0678 -0.1051 -0.0074 0.209 0.052 1 
Soc Ex 0.3356 0.1043 0.3601 -0.0146 -0.0346 -0.1134 -0.1292 1 
Inflation 0.0013 0.0011 0.0008 0.0052 0.0038 0.0426 -0.0793 0.0023 1 
GFC 0.0127 0.0035 0.0301 0.2813 0.3537 0.1962 0.3768 0.0066 0.0263 1 
POPGR 0.0984 0.0396 0.1072 0.0903 0.0148 -0.1414 -0.2916 -0.0402 0.0227 -0.1642 1 
GDPpc -0.158 -0.0535 -0.1804 -0.0437 0.056 0.0702 0.3985 -0.1381 -0.0638 0.0962 -0.4134 1 
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< Appendix Table 4>  Regression Results of Full Sample (2005-2013) 
 
Dependent Variable: Equation (1) Equation (2) HDI 
ODA 0.000581 
  (0.77) 
ODA² 0.00000176** 
  (2.09) 
ODA *ICRG -0.000805 
  (-1.48) 
FDI 0.00176*** 0.00169*** 
  (2.95) (3.13) 
FDI*ICRG -0.000858*** -0.000832*** 
  (-3.01) (-3.23) 
Trade 0.0000585 0.0000859 
  (0.59) (0.96) 
ICRG 0.0123 0.00591 
  (1.69) (0.81) 
Social Expenditure 0.000525*** 0.000353*** 
  (4.27) (4.01) 
Inflation -0.000106 -0.000135* 
  (-1.73) (-2.00) 
GFC 0.000779* 0.000727** 
  (2.64) (2.43) 
Population Growth 0.00954* 0.00771 
  (1.82) (1.40) 
GDPpc 0.00000655*** 0.00000697*** 
  (6.86) (6.90) 
Social ODA  -0.00256 
  (-1.18) 
(Social ODA)² 0.0000183** 
  (2.06) 
Social ODA *ICRG 0.000225 
  (0.19) 
Economic ODA  0.0132*** 
  (4.32) 
(Economic ODA)² -0.0000811*** 
  (-4.17) 
Economic ODA *ICRG -0.00487*** 
  (-3.19) 
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Production ODA  -0.0117 
  (-1.16) 
(Production ODA)² 0.000850 
  (1.10) 
Production ODA *ICRG 0.00511 
  (1.08) 
Multi ODA  -0.0100 
  (-1.16) 
(Multi ODA)² 1.243** 
  (2.34) 
Multi ODA *ICRG 0.00371 
  (0.80) 
_cons 0.506*** 0.520*** 
  (25.14) (25.59) 
N 640 639 
Note: 1) Number in parentheses are t-statistics. 
2) *, **, ***, represent the level of significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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< Appendix Table 5> Regression Results of Sub-samples by Geographical Location 
 
Dependent 
Variable: Asia Africa Latin America 
HDI Equation(1.1) Equation(1.2) Equation(2.1) Equation(2.2) Equation(3.1) Equation(3.2)
ODA 0.0105 -0.000139 -0.0112*** 
(0.51) (-0.09) (-4.93) 
ODA² 0.000596 0.00000320** 0.0000728***
(1.18) (2.58) (6.27) 
ODA *ICRG -0.00810 -0.000539 0.00366*** 
(-1.11) (-0.57) (3.87) 
FDI -0.00482 -0.00633* 0.00145 0.00157* -0.000754 -0.00132 
(-1.32) (-1.93) (1.49) (1.74) (-0.52) (-0.90) 
FDI*ICRG 0.00168 0.00238* -0.000617 -0.000659 0.000169 0.000403 
(1.18) (1.91) (-1.09) (-1.29) (0.32) (0.73) 
Trade 0.0000810 0.0000704 0.0000578 0.000114 0.0000559 0.0000266 
(0.37) (0.24) (0.38) (0.94) (0.44) (0.21) 
ICRG 0.0443 0.0304 0.000911 -0.00961 -0.0136* -0.0132* 
(1.40) (0.87) (0.08) (-1.02) (-2.03) (-1.75) 
Social 
Expenditure 0.00520* 0.00514 0.00114*** 0.000653** 0.000380*** 0.0000553 
(1.99) (1.11) (3.28) (2.30) (10.00) (1.34) 
Inflation -0.000113 -0.000195 -0.000129** -0.000171** -0.000451** -0.000449* 
(-0.51) (-0.78) (-2.21) (-2.31) (-2.31) (-2.04) 
GFC -0.000529 -0.000601 0.000969** 0.000969*** 0.0000839 -0.000108 
(-0.73) (-0.75) (2.47) (2.79) (0.23) (-0.27) 
Population -0.0122 -0.0155 0.0141** 0.0107* -0.00473 -0.00755 
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Growth 
(-0.88) (-1.17) (2.50) (1.70) (-0.48) (-0.76) 
GDPpc 0.00000542 0.00000485 0.0000122*** 0.0000149*** 0.00000490*** 0.00000491***
(1.70) (1.51) (3.27) (4.36) (12.02) (11.55) 
Social ODA 0.0471 -0.00184 0.00184 
(0.91) (-0.59) (0.18) 
(Social ODA)² 0.00600 0.00000209 0.0000745***
(1.18) (0.15) (3.20) 
Social ODA 
*ICRG  -0.0275  0.0000238  -0.00361 
(-1.31) (0.01) (-0.66) 
Economic ODA 0.00683 0.0147*** 0.0201** 
(0.15) (3.07) (2.57) 
(Economic 
ODA)²  -0.0000567  0.000162  -0.0000525 
(-0.08) (0.80) (-1.56) 
Economic ODA 
*ICRG  -0.00192  -0.00619**  -0.00944** 
(-0.10) (-2.13) (-2.44) 
Production ODA -0.0303 -0.0221 -0.0429 
(-0.71) (-1.63) (-1.69) 
(Production 
ODA)²  0.0121  0.00149*  0.0000795 
(0.77) (1.80) (0.08) 
Production ODA 
*ICRG  0.00863  0.00970  0.0200 
(0.87) (1.45) (1.61) 
Multi ODA -0.348 -0.00375 -0.112*** 
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Note: 1) Number in parentheses are t-statistics. 
2) *, **, ***, represent the level of significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
  
(-1.23) (-0.33) (-4.14) 
(Multi ODA)² 241.0 1.075** 38.71*** 
(0.54) (2.16) (5.83) 
Multi ODA 
*ICRG  0.118  0.000538  0.0439*** 
(0.97) (0.07) (3.41) 
_cons 0.526*** 0.569*** 0.403*** 0.422*** 0.702*** 0.721*** 
(5.67) (4.85) (15.35) (17.01) (35.03) (34.71) 
N 107 107 302 301 158 158 
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< Appendix Table 6> Regression Results of Sub-samples by Income Level 
 
Dependent Variable: UMICs LMICs LDCs 
HDI Equation(1.1) Equation(1.2) Equation(2.1) Equation(2.2) Equation(3.1) Equation(3.2) 
      
ODA -0.00140 -0.000767   -0.00292*** 
  (-0.48) (-0.83)   (-3.19) 
ODA² -0.00000264 0.00000134   0.0000116***
  (-0.74) (0.85)   (2.93) 
ODA *ICRG 0.000510 -0.0000591   0.000382 
  (0.28) (-0.16)   (1.02) 
FDI -0.000909 0.000464 0.00230 0.00384 -0.000273 0.0000778 
  (-0.44) (0.21) (0.66) (1.48) (-1.30) (0.34) 
FDI*ICRG -0.000543 -0.00112 -0.00107 -0.00168 0.000160** 0.0000403 
  (-0.49) (-0.94) (-0.74) (-1.53) (1.98) (0.47) 
Trade 0.0000917 0.0000911 0.0000148 0.0000463 -0.0000769 -0.0000546 
  (0.58) (0.64) (0.08) (0.26) (-0.55) (-0.36) 
ICRG 0.0120 0.00320 0.0445* 0.0536** -0.00304 -0.000818 
  (0.56) (0.16) (1.93) (2.51) (-0.34) (-0.09) 
Social Expenditure 0.0000574*** 0.000323* 0.0000493 0.000408*** 0.00169*** 0.00201*** 
  (2.70) (1.59) (0.44) (4.38) (2.94) (2.74) 
Inflation 0.000109 0.000131 -0.0000950 -0.0000612 -0.000303* -0.000310* 
  (0.57) (0.79) (-1.27) (-0.76) (-1.98) (-1.82) 
GFC 0.00159* 0.00150* -0.000118 -0.00000350 0.000631** 0.000576* 
  (1.69) (1.59) (-0.18) (-0.00) (2.12) (1.68) 
Population Growth -0.0110 -0.00732 0.0196* 0.0256** -0.0130** -0.0173** 
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  (-0.72) (-0.51) (1.84) (2.31) (-2.10) (-2.44) 
GDPpc 0.00000068** 0.00000065** 0.00000051*** 0.00000048*** 7.02e-08*** 7.00e-08*** 
  (2.22) (2.25) (3.47) (3.42) (7.27) (7.25) 
Social ODA  -0.00820   0.0140* -0.00287 
  (-1.33)   (1.55) (-1.20) 
(Social ODA)² 0.000285**   -0.00000904 0.0000197 
  (2.39)   (-0.16) (0.90) 
Social ODA *ICRG -0.00317   -0.00798** 0.000670 
  (-1.14)   (-2.18) (0.49) 
Economic ODA  -0.0166   0.0180*** -0.000970 
  (-0.96)   (3.37) (-0.31) 
(Economic ODA)² 0.0000122   -0.000117* -0.00000488 
  (1.01)   (-1.84) (-0.19) 
Economic ODA *ICRG 0.00870   -0.00723*** 0.000703 
  (0.96)   (-2.78) (0.44) 
Production ODA  -0.122***   -0.0458*** -0.00227 
  (-5.05)   (-2.91) (-0.33) 
(Production ODA)² 0.00349**   0.000279** -0.0000297 
  (2.25)   (2.62) (-0.05) 
Production ODA 
*ICRG  0.0546***   0.0203**  0.000848 
  (3.15)   (2.55) (0.26) 
Multi ODA  -0.0149   -0.0556*** 0.0138 
  (-1.08)   (-3.37) (0.93) 
(Multi ODA)² 0.00134   0.000755*** 0.000874 
  (1.46)   (3.11) (0.43) 
Multi ODA *ICRG 0.00680   0.0233*** -0.00958* 
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  (0.63)   (2.71) (-2.03) 
_cons 0.542*** 0.540*** 0.448*** 0.404*** 0.602*** 0.591*** 
  (10.14) (8.60) (8.44) (8.03) (21.22) (19.99) 
N 190 189 159 159 254 254 
Note: 1) Number in parentheses are t-statistics. 
2) *, **, ***, represent the level of significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
34 
 
< Appendix Table 7> Classification of Sample Countries by Geographical Location 
 
Asia Africa Latin America 
Afghanistan Algeria Argentina 
Armenia Angola Belize 
Azerbaijan Benin Bolivia 
Bangladesh Botswana Brazil 
Bhutan Burkina Faso Chile 
Georgia Burundi Colombia 
Kazakhstan Cabo Verde Costa Rica 
Kyrgyzstan Cameroon Dominican Republic 
Maldives Central African Republic Ecuador 
Nepal Chad El Salvador 
Pakistan Comoros Guatemala 
Sri Lanka Congo Haiti 
Tajikistan Côte d'Ivoire Honduras 
Turkmenistan Democratic Republic of the Congo Jamaica 
Uzbekistan Egypt Mexico 
Cambodia Ethiopia Nicaragua 
Indonesia Gabon Panama 
Lao People's 
Democratic Republic Gambia Paraguay 
Malaysia Ghana Peru 
Mongolia Guinea Uruguay 
Philippines Guinea-Bissau 
Thailand Kenya 
Timor-Leste Lesotho 
Viet Nam Liberia 
Libya 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Niger 
Nigeria 
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Rwanda 
 
 
 
Sao Tome and 
Principe  
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
South Africa 
Sudan 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Tunisia 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
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< Appendix Table 8> Classification of Sample Countries by Income Level 
Source: World Bank (2012) 
UMICs LMICs LDCs 
Albania Armenia Afghanistan 
Algeria Belize Angola 
Argentina Bolivia Bangladesh 
Azerbaijan Cabo Verde Benin 
Belarus Cameroon Bhutan 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Congo Burkina Faso 
Botswana Côte d'Ivoire Burundi 
Brazil Egypt Cambodia 
Chile El Salvador Central African Republic 
Colombia Fiji Chad 
Costa Rica Georgia Comoros 
Dominican Republic Ghana Democratic Republic of the Congo 
Ecuador Guatemala Ethiopia 
Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia Honduras Gambia 
Gabon Indonesia Guinea 
Iran Iraq Guinea-Bissau 
Jamaica Moldova Haiti 
Jordan Mongolia Kiribati 
Kazakhstan Morocco Lao People's Democratic Republic 
Lebanon Nicaragua Lesotho 
Libya Nigeria Liberia 
Malaysia Pakistan Madagascar 
Maldives Paraguay Malawi 
Mauritius Philippines Mauritania 
Mexico Sri Lanka Mozambique 
Namibia Swaziland Nepal 
Panama Tonga Niger 
Peru Turkmenistan Rwanda 
Serbia Ukraine Samoa 
South Africa Uzbekistan Sao Tome and Principe 
Thailand Viet Nam Senegal 
Thailand Senegal 
Tunisia Sierra Leone 
Solomon Islands 
Sudan 
Tanzania 
Timor-Leste 
Togo 
Uganda 
Vanuatu 
Zambia 
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